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PART

I

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper is a case study in public
policy, specifically a study of the patent policy of
the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Many government
funded scientific
research projects spawn patentable inventions,
and it is the

task of public policy to determine in whom
the oatent rights
to these inventions vest.
The patent policy question reflects

larger issue, one which concerns how the fruits
of "government science" are, and ought to be, divided among
its ootential
a

beneficiaries.
Our country is becoming increasingly deoendent on science
and technology for prosperity and national security,
so much
so that the government is now the most important natron
of

scientific research.^
ledge,

-

Knowledge, especially scientific know-

seems destined to become the primary source of wealth

and power in the future if it is not already that now.

Thus

it seems important to ask how public policy regarding scien-

tific output is made, who shall control such output, and what
steps are being taken to insure that research results are made

available to the widest possible range of users.

Certainly,

artificial limitations on effective technology transfer such
as may stem from legal technicalities would not seem to make

sense from a scientific, economic, or political ooint of view.

^Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969)
op. 14-2 8.
,

,

.

2
i'lany

activities of crucial importance to the national

interest have been effected over the last few decades through

arrangements of government-industry cooperation.

For

a

vari-

ety of reasons a blurring of the boundary line between the
public and private sector was not viewed as a matter of great
concern.

Government patent policy constitutes

of this blurring effect:

a good

exarrmle

that most inventions arising from

publicly funded research are given away primarily to government contractors seems to be officially regarded as
of convenience.

a

matter

But now a more active concern for the output

of government science appears to be warranted, and this paper

will examine the current state of public policy in this area

specifically with

a

view to discovering whether patent policy

fits more or less into an incrementalist or comprehensivist

mold

Source material for this thesis covers

fields and takes a variety of forms.

a

number of

The controversy over

government patent policy is not a new one, and several extensive studies of it have been carried out under government

auspices.

This paper utilizes two recent studies, one which

covers the patent policy of NASA specifically, and another

which covers research activities of all government agencies
and the problem as a whole.

A

large number of articles per-

taining to government patent policy can be found in law reviews and they constituted a good source of information.

Another class of books and articles covering "technology

-
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transfer" was consulted, and a NASA sponsored study of
space

program spinoff is particularly utilized.
the source material covers are:

Other areas which

government science policy in

general, the space program, and the patent system.

Also,

sev-

eral papers pertaining to technology transfer and government

science in Great Britain and Hjurope were utilized in this research.

The writings of spokesmen for incrementalist and com-

prehensivist approaches to policy making were likewise examined,
and their arguments will be dealt with presently.

The patent policy issue has,

over the years, mainly fo-

cussed on one simple issue: should patent rights to inventions

arising from government sponsored research be claimed by the
government, or should they, as

a

matter of government policy,

be allowed to vest in private corporations?
is simple,

But if the issue

the solution is not, for while it is normal busi-

ness procedure for the backers of research to claim patent

rights as a legitimate return on their investment, the government clearly does not possess the same attributes as

a

private

business; it cannot be a marketer of spinoff unless it decides
to become involved in the manufacturing business.

Some stu-

dents of the problem argue that the patents should be in the
public domain, while their opponents reply that this would

nullify the usefulness of the exclusive patent right as an
incentive for marketing an invention.

The complexity of the

problem is apparent: not only are the public’s rights involved,
but also there is the question of how best to achieve technology

u

transfer.

For example, effective technology transfer would

insure that advances in space research such as improved
methods of handling very cold liquids are made known to
potential

civilian users like manufacturers of truck refrigeration systems

.

But before those issues just mentioned can be examined,
an equally difficult and complex problem must be taken ud,
one in which the idea of

challenged.

’’the

public’s rights” seems to be

Questions about the existence of

a

definable

’’public interest” and about the influence of private pressure

groups on public policy currently fill the air, it seems,

whenever particular government policies are scrutinized.

It

can be argued that government patent policy is unduly influ-

enced by private special interests, and that a definite lack
of public policy exists in the area of spinoff arising from

government research.

The patchwork of practices concerning

spinoff which does exist could be said to be traceable to
the influence of government contractors, who are intimately

involved in the government’s science program.

On the other

hand, it could be argued that interest groups are an inevit-

able presence and serve a useful purpose.

There is one school

of thought which holds that private pressure group influence

over policy making is both natural and legitimate and serves
to make government responsive to political demand.

This posi-

tion has been called ’’incrementalist” and its adherents ’’interest group liberals.”

There is another school of thought which

5

argues that the government should pursue policies
which are

impartial and in "the public interest;" this is the
position
held by the "comprehensivists

.

"

It would be tempting to por-

tray the dispute between the incrementalists and the
compre-

hensivists in black and white terms, but in actuality there
are gray areas between the two sides, and their spokesmen

themselves are somewhat wary of speaking in absolutes.
as will be pointed out later,

Also,

their arguments do not make up

all that can be said on the subject of public policy formation.

Nevertheless, the incrementalist/comprehensivist dis-

pute is extremely helpful in clarifying the patent policy

problem.

Tne arguments of both sides will now be presented.

Six main points of disagreement can be discerned in
this controversy.

The first and perhaps most important one

concerns the complexity of modern government and its impli-

cations for policy-making.
of view,

From the incrementalist point

the best way to achieve understanding is to break

off fragments of reality and subject them to scrutiny.

The

incrementalist policy-maker makes use of certain strategies
and dodges to avoid taking on a problem as

a

whole because

he is in a "universe that he is wise enough to know is too

big for him." 2

It follows that changes in government programs

should take the form of small rather than big steps.

Such

^Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process,
p".
27.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 196$
,

)

,

a

.
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piecemeal approach is also held desirable because
it is said
to enhance political stability.

The incrementalists are skep-

tical of "unbiased'' analyses of political and
governmental

problems; they feel that neutrality is very difficult
to achieve

but that the "partisan analysis" of government policy
problems
done by interest groups is useful because it is usually
focussed
on a narrow area.
of the analysis,

As long as one bears in mind the partiality
it can be helpful.

Comprehensive prescrip-

tions for remedying government problems are distrusted by the

incrementalists because they seem to contain seeds of authoritarianism.

Finally, such comprehensive prescriptions are

made in pursuit of the "public interest," and as Charles E.

Lindblom argues in his book The Policy Making Process

:

"Clear-

ly there is no general agreement on what constitutes the public interest.

Comprehensivists also focus much attention on the complexity of government and its problems, but they feel that
such complexity calls for greater, not lesser efforts aimed
at ordering governmental activities.

in his book The End of Liberalism

Theodore Lowi writes
"The fact of the matter

:

seems to be that the immense complexity of development and

control in the industrial society are too powerful for thought-

less institutions."^ Comprehensivists criticize the incrementalist
-

3

Ibid

.

,

p.

17.

^Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc .
1969
P^ 27
,

)

,

,

(New York:
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approach because they feel that it
leads to the granting of
special favors to pressure groups.
Since the comprehensivists believe that centralized policy
making can work, such
special favors are felt to be basically
unfair.
It could be
argued that the variance between the views
of the incremen-

talists and the comprehensivists is linked to
their differing
political perceptions regarding government power.
While the

incrementalists seem to fear centralized government
as being
prone to repression, comprehensivists fear a
hegemony of soecial interests over government.

This type of fundamental dis-

agreement cannot be resolved here, but the examination
of NASA’
patent policy which comes later should give some
indication
of

how appropriate each of these theoretical positions is
when

confronted with a specific policy problem.
It can be said at this point that comprehensivists
would

probably interpret the fragmentation of current government
patent policy as an example of how interest group influence

prevents government from being effective at solving its problems.

Incrementalists, the comprehensivists would argue, do

not give sufficient credence to the power of interest groups
to erode, rather than to contribute to public policy.

Such

power should be subject to a certain amount of restraint in
the public interest, and comprehensivists feel that it is

government’s role to administer restraints where necessary
if the

public interest is involved.

When interest group in-

fluence is the deciding factor in certain areas of public
policy, then, as Theodore Lowi argues, there exists

’’a

crisis

s

of public authority-' which will not
be resolved until public

authority is restored.

A relevant question to ask at
this

point could be whether or not present
patent policy, or the
technological matters to which it applies, are
of such a complex nature that any changes in patent policy
must only take
place in small steps. Hopefully, the analysis
contained in

Parts Two and Three provides some answers to this
question.

Incrementalists accept interest group influence as being a healthy aspect of the political process because
they

feel a "balance of power" exists between interest groups.
The existence of such a balance of power constitutes the
second main point of contention between the two camos.

Since the

incrementalists believe in the balance of power it follows that
they do not fear that any single interest can Dossess unchecked

dominion over certain areas of public policy.

Aaron Wildavsky,

in his book The Politics of the Budgetary Process says that the

federal budget amounts to "a web of social as well as legal re-

lationships in which commitments are made by all the narties,
and where sanctions may be invoked (though not necessarily equally)

by all. "5

He also writes that "no one group of men

.

.

.

can necessarily impose their preferences uDon others within
the American political system. "6

The interest group liberals,

^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964
p^ 37
)

6 Ibid.,

p.

131.

,

.

z
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it could be said,

seem to see in the great diversity
of inter-

est groups a kind of natural system
of self-adjustment and
checks and balances.
Lindblom writes "The play of power in
policy making is not as rough, harsh,
violent and bloody, even
in authoritarian states,

as might be suooosed."?

Lindblom

seems to be saying that the balance of rower
plays

a

role in

many different types of political systems and
perhaes constitutes a natural element of politics everywhere.
The comprehensivist side replies that the
notion of a

balance of power in politics constitutes

a

rather idealized

picture of reality, and that such balance of rower
which does
exist is by no means perfect.

Theodore Lowi notes that

a

strong similarity exists between the nineteenth century idea
of

automatic society" self-regulated by various laisse

faire

mechanisms and the interest group liberal postures of today.
He writes that an "obvious feature of pluralist reasoning is

that with pluralism society remains automatic."

equilibrium is really the public interest."^

"Pluralist

Just as cacital-

ism stressed that economic competition was an adequate means
of social control,

interest group liberals argue that com-

petition between groups is sufficient in sunolying its own
controls for the public interest.

7

'Lindblom, Policy Making Process

$Lowi

,

End of Liberalism

,

p.

L7.

,

p.

37.

.
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Comprehensivists feel that the idea of
an "invisible
hand" guiding economics and politics
has been discredited
by experience.
They believe that social controls
sometimes
need to be consciously spoiled,
and that such application
should take the form of explicit
public policies consciously
applied and enforced through vigorous
administration.
"Ra-

tionality applied to social control is
administration. "9
Lowi argues that many modern interest
grouts do not balance
each other off because of their specialization,
which
leads

to interest group power that is oligarchic
rather than com-

petitive

Incrementalists acknowledge that groups often do
not
so much compete as cooperate: when groups
disagree

there is

a

tendency for them to search for some common ground
of agree-

ment, and such a search can lead to new and unanticipated
ways
of solving certain problems.

Comprehensivists reply that such

"mutual accommodation" still does not fundamentally alter
the
power of interest groups over some areas of policy making.

Again we see a basic difference in political perceDtion between
the two camps: both sides witness the same phenomenon but draw

different conclusions from it according to their attitudes towards public and private power.

In terms of patent Dolicy,

this point of disagreement concerning balance of power between

interest groups should lead us to inquire into the nature and

9lbid

.

,

p.

27.

0

"
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make-up of patent policy interest groups.
if these interest groups do,

in fact,

We should also ask

serve to check and bal-

ance one another.
The third major point of disagreement between incremen-

talists and comprehensivists is closely related to the balance
of power concept:

interest group liberals believe that the

interplay between groups proceeds according to certain "rules
of the game" which work to give each interest group at least

some satisfaction of its desires.

Thus laws imposed by gov-

ernment can be viewed as unnecessary in many cases since relationships between groups seem civilized and self-regulating.
This argument would seem to be nullified if, in the realm of
patent policy, there were no countervailing interest groups
or other elements of society with which to have give-and-take.

Nevertheless, interest group liberals seem generally distrustful of controls on groups imposed from the outside.

writes:
_
__
cion.
•

»t

"Coordination

is

Wildavsky

often just another word for coer-

1

The incrementalist understanding of the word "rule"

seems somewhat more encompassing than

definition, which states that

for conduct." 11

a

a

strict dictionary

rule is "a prescribed guide

Lindblom cites as an example of

a

"rule"

10 Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process
11 Webster
p.

871.

t

s

Collegiate Dictionary

,

,

o.

153.

Fifth Edition, 1%6,

2
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that the wishes of the public at large
cannot be completely
ignored by any leader, no matter how
powerful he may be. 12
It could be argued that "constraint"
is a more accurate word
to use than "rule" for this situation,
but since incrementalists seem to feel that the political process
is capable of

generating certain apparently universal constraints
on policy
makers, it can be understood why they use the
word
"rule."

In other words,

incrementalists seem to believe that compet-

ing interest groups will interact in a generally
predictable

way, and that part of this interaction is made up
of a set
of predictable "rules of the game."

To incrementalists,

these

preordained "rules" seem to be just as binding as rules or
laws consciously enacted.

Again we see that much of the con-

flict between incrementalists and comorehensivists is based
on their differences in political perception, which seems in
some cases to elevate the importance of semantics.
The comprehensivist camp feels that adherence to infor-

mal rules which are often not consciously devised is no substitute for law and due process.

Lowi writes: "Consideration

of the justice in or achieved by an action cannot be made

unless a deliberate and conscious attempt was made by the

actor to derive the action from

a

general rule or moral prin-

ciple governing such a class of acts." 1 ^ Comprehensivists

1

Lindblom, Policy Making Process

13

^Lowi, End of Liberalism

,

p.

,

290.

p.

UU.
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argue that public policy formation cannot be left
to processes

which time and again seem to lead to the granting of
special
favors to certain groups.

Grant McConnell, author of Private

Po wer and American Democracy

,

points out that voluntary asso-

ciations constitute a major element of America’s social and

economic make-up, and that they have always been loci of jeal-

ously guarded private power.

The notion of ’’self-help” has

always militated against the ’’interf erence” of lawmakers in
the affairs of private associations.

McConnell writes:

”In

comments made by AFL leaders on the law and the courts was
an implicit dislike for the very idea of law, and not merely

for the law that touched labor.

Freedom seems almost de-

fined by the interest group liberals as a mere absence of

government regulations, says McConnell.
The comprehensivists contend that special interests

certainly ought to be subject to some control over what they
do where it affects the public interest.

It could be argued

that in programs where ’’cooperation” between government and

elements of the private sector takes place, such as in government science, laws relating to the nature of that ’’cooperation” should be promulgated.

Lowi argues that use of law

makes governmental planning much easier, allows the actions
of government to be judged according to clear standards, and

-^Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. $2.
(New York:

,

u
enhances democratic forms.

It should be noted that the patent

policy controversy is largely a legal one; thus the
appropriateness of pluralist informality in this area seems questionable.

The task of science policy formation as a whole could

be said to require that conscious decisions be made relating

research projects to one another and to overall goals so that

government science can be most effective.

Comprehensivists

argue that law is well suited to help provide these standards
and goals.
The incrementalists would reply to the comprehensivists’

desire to set goals with the argument that interest groups
are a vehicle of expression of public wants and opinions.

Thus in a sense interest groups do help set goals, or at least

indicate which ones are politically feasible.

The represen-

tativeness of interest groups constitutes the fourth main
point of controversy between the two camps.

Lindblom views

the role of the interest group as being largely educative

rather than as being pressure oriented

He explains that

.

much interest group activity is devoted to explaining policy
issues to the membership.

The membership,

in turn,

is able

to transmit to the group leaders its "informed" opinions and

desires.

Interest group liberals believe that the communica-

tions function

of interest groups is one form of their demo-

cratic nature.

They also believe that with enough hard work

•^Lindblom, Policy-Making Process

,

p.

62.
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almost any group in society can become
effective at getting
its voice heard.
The comprehensivist reply to the argument
that interest

groups are democratic stresses that some interest
and community minorities are systematically excluded from
having

a voice

in public affairs.

This results, as McConnell says, from the

way constituency is structured.

He argues that private asso-

ciations, especially ones with very narrow purpose, tend
to

adhere to the "iron law of oligarchy" by which the internal

structure of an organization becomes very autocratic.

Inter-

est groups generally tend to want to present to the world an
image of solidarity, and this is especially easy for special

purpose interest groups with rather homogeneous memberships.

McConnell points out that if certain interest groups do not
have countervailing interest groups to limit their rower, the
issue of internal democracy becomes crucial.

McConnell does

not feel that the tight-knit, informally organized interest

groups which seem to be reminiscent of "town meeting democracy"
are really that at all:

"There is a direct connection between

size of the community, degree of formality of relationships,
and ease or difficulty of enforcing patterns of subordination. "16

McConnell recalls Madison’s point in F ederalist #10 that bigness of a country can be a virtue in so far as controlling the

"schemes of oppression" of factions is concerned.

•^McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy
p.

107.

,
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Not only does minority expression tend to be
excluded

from many interest groups internally, it seems also
clear that
many classes of people, such as, for example,
consumers, are
not well suited to being organized into an interest
grout?.

Thus comprehensivists do not want to rely exclusively
on interest groups to express public opinion and determine policy
in
the public interest.

Whether or not patent policy can be

thought of as being democratically formulated, or is in some
sense the product of the public’s desires,

is a

question which

this disagreement over the ’’representativeness” of interest

groups presses upon us.

In other words, we may ask, what is

the nature of patent policy’s "constituency”?

This question

will be dealt with in Parts Two and Three.
A

fifth point of dispute between incrementalists and

comprehensivists concerns the separation of government from
the private sector.

The interest group liberal seems to

feel that a blurring of the boundary line between the Dublic
and private sectors is not a great problem.

Indeed,

interest

group interaction with political administration is seen as
the essence of politics; thus interest group influence on

government is seen as legitimate and even desirable because
it ostensibly keeps the government responsive.

Such pheno-

mena as the "dollar a year man” recruited from private industry to advise the government, and "regulatory” agencies which

seem captured by the parties supposedly regulated perhaps

would appear to violate the pluralist’s laissez faire beliefs

17

regarding government involvement in the affairs
of private
associations. But the basis for this seeming
inconsistency
lies in the way interest group liberals
perceive the political process: as was noted before, it is
government power

which seems most feared by the incrementalists;
on the other
hand,

interest group power is not feared.
It could be argued that the dividing line
between the

public and private sectors is particularly blurred in the

realm of government science, with professional people and

executives frequently crossing back and forth between government posts and private employment.
ing,

It should not be surpris-

then, to find that science policy in certain areas seems

greatly influenced by private interests.

Amatai Etzioni, for

example, has called the Apollo Program a "moondoggle" because
it has made work for hundreds of aerospace companies when our

science dollar perhaps could have been more productively spent
on other areas such as oceanography, although these areas have

less special interest clout.

It seems necessary that soecific

areas of policy, such as patent policy, be examined in order
to determine whether or not interest group influence has been

salutary.
The comprehensivists

,

not surprisingly, argue that lines

of governmental authority should always be kept clear.

This,

of course, also serves to keep the boundary between public and

private clear.

The comprehensivists express great concern over

the power of special interests, saying that power is power no

IS

matter who exercises it.

They feel that the authority and

legitimacy of the government is in doubt
when special interests seem to be forming policy in the
name of the United States.
The comprehensivist definition of nolitics
apoears
to be more

precise than the incrementalist's in the
sense that it insists
on judging the actions of government as
government. Lowi
writes. "Despite what social science may say,
nolitics is

morality.
bad,

Politics is the making of choices between good
and

choices of priorities among competing good things. "1?

Lowi makes just the opposite interpretation of interest
group

influence on policy than the incrementalists make: instead
of

being the ultimate expression of politics, interest group
influence represents, according to a central tenet of nluralism,

discontinuity between that which is socioeconomic

'a

and that which is political.

The informality of government

industry "cooperation" is really a symptom of the demise of
politics:
Lowi,

"The fusion of capitalism and Dluralism," says

"was a success; destruction of the Drinciple of separate

government was its secret. "-*-9
Part of the patent policy question involves the basic

fairness to the taxpayer and to non-contractor businesses

l^Lowi, End of Liberalism
•^ Ibid .

^ibid

,

p.

45.

,

p.

54.

-

.

,

p.

231.
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of awarding patent rights free of charge
to companies doing

research for the government.

It perhaps could be argued that

interest group liberalism does not make room for
questions of
the justice of certain government policies
after pressure grouo

interaction has played itself out and the policy has
become
fixed.
a

The extent to which present patent policy represents

blurring of the boundary line between the public and private

sectors, and whether or not this blurring is healthy and/or

necessary are questions with which later sections of this report will deal.
Ihe sixth point of disagreement between incrementalists

and comprehensivists is a somewhat academic one:

incremental-

ists seem to claim that their analysis of policy making is

basically neutral and value free, while comprehensivists, of
course, dispute this.

Lindblora suggests that since Dolicy

makers are pretty much limited by the complexity of the tasks
facing them, interest in the process of policy making, rather
than the power of interest groups, is more warranted.

In other

words, it seems to be easy for an incrementalist to think of

himself as being neutral about values.

It is no accident that

Lindblora titles his book The Policy Making Process

,

and Wildav-

sky titles his book The Politics of the Budgetary Process

.

In both works the authors draw extensively on studies of how

policy is made, that is to say, the mechanics of the process,
by describing all the particular strategies and dodges employed
by government officials involved in policy formation.

This

20

myriad of maneuvers convinces the
incrementalists that "policv
problems simply run beyond his [the
official's] analytical competence
By a kind of osmosis the
incrementalism which seems
forced upon policy makers is adopted
by its students.
In an
ironic turnabout, the incrementalists
seem to claim for themselves the analytical neutrality which
they strongly
argue is

almost impossible for policy makers to
achieve.

The interest

group liberals apparently do not choose
to make judgments on
policy per se they seem to accent the
outcome of group interaction as part of the "art of the possible."
;

The comprehensivists say that interest
grouo liberalism
is by no means value free and that it
amounts mainly to an

apology for the status qu£.

The comprehensivists cite the

apparent ideological inconsistency of incrementalists
regarding interest group involvement in government as an
indication
of tne opportunism and basically self-serving nature
of inter-

est groups.

Unlike the incrementalists, the comprehensivists

are very much concerned with who makes policy, and they see
the ostensibly value free interest group liberals making value

laden prescriptions when they argue against governmental controls on interest groups.
cess,

The incrementalist emphasis on pro-

the comprehensivists argue, leads only to a misleading

and artificial paradigm of the political process.

sivists also find in interest group liberalism

2D

Lindblom, Policy-Making Process

,

p.

a

116.

Comprehendefinite
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conservative bias.

There is, of course, nothin? wrong with

being conservative except that it tends to erode the incrementalists apparent claim of neutrality.

Lindblom admits to a

certain conservative bias in incrementalism in the sense that
it reflects people’s preferences and cannot run ahead of them.

Gomprehensivists would go further and charge that there is too
close an association between special interests and wealth, and

that this connection often militates against Drogressive social programs which would tend to spread affluence more evenly
in the population.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the two
camps is that while the incrementalists seem largely to accent
the status quo in politics the comprehensivists see great dan-

ger in this.

Lowi lists "four counts against interest grouD

liberalism as

a

corruptor of democratic government”:

first,

interest group liberalism works to confuse expectations about

democratic institutions; second, government is rendered impotent by catering to interest groups:

’’Delegation of power

has become alienation of public domain

eignty to private satrapies." 2

-

the gift of sover-

Third, interest grouo liber-

-^

alism demoralizes government by preventing it from achieving
justice; and fourth, democratic government is corrupted because its forms are evaded by interest grouo liberalism,

21 Lowi, End of Liberalism

,

p.

239.
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which results in great public cynicism
towards government.
In each case interest group liberalism
could be said to prevent
the government from acting as government,
and thus we
are

brought back to the initial division between the
two camps,
that over government power.

Whether or not this dispute over government power is

eventually resolved, the fact seems to remain that certain
policies of the government still need to be subjected to critical examination.

Francis E. Rourke

,

in his book Bureaucra cv

.

politics, and Public Policy does not seem to be stalled over
the question of government power.

For Rourke, both incremen-

talist and comprehensivist positions have some merit because
he feels that government actions should be both responsive

and effective,

if possible.

There is, however, a crucial ele-

ment in modern bureaucracy which challenges incrementalist and

comprehensivist alike, and that is the presence and need for
expertise in administrative activities.
fore,

expertise plays

ence policy.

a

As was mentioned be-

particularly significant role in sci-

It could be argued that expertise lies outside

the realm of group process, but at the same time expertise

cannot be ignored by the comprehensivist who would emphasize
the value of administrative hierarchy.

Rourke points out that

hierarchy can be a source of arbitrariness and irrationality
in the face of correct expertise.

Nevertheless, experts need

to be under some form of influence or control.
is a source of bureaucratic power,

"If politics

so too is knowledge," says

"

•

,
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Rourke. 22

"Professionalism is rapidly succeeding
politics as
the principal source of decentralization
of authority in American bureaucracy.
A subordinate who is master
of esoteric
skills is no easier to dominate than one
backed up by a strongly entrenched group of political supporters.” 2 ^
Rourke lists several possible ways to integrate
the expert into our governmental system of checks and
balances.

One

suggestion is to create semi-autonomous "super boards"
which
could bring to bear on policy problems both specialized
know-

ledge and

a

broad view of the public interest.

Another sugges-

tion involves trying to bring into government people whose
edu-

cation prompts them as administrators to be more responsive to
the public interest;

"Then the problem of controlling bureau-

cratic power is very largely solved at the source" says Rourke. 2 ^
A

third possible way of controlling bureaucrats is to create

new agencies to circumvent deeply entrenched bases of oower.
It is notable that Rourke does not

in an a priori fashion ex-

clude either incrementalist or comprehensivist approaches:

"Incremental and comprehensive ways of looking at policy issues
need not always be mutually exclusive

.
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Thus we seem impelled

22 Francis E. Rourke,

Policy

Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1969)

,

,

2 -^

Ibid

.

,

p.

105

^Ibid

.

,

p.

1L5

25 Ibid.

,

p.

122.

2

•

2U
to examine policy problems individually
and to try ascertain

solutions appropriate to them.

The study of NASA's patent

policy which follows will strive to do
this without trying
to make judgments on the usefulness of
either incrementalism
or comprehensivism in areas other than
patent policy.

PART II

NASA'S PATENT POLICIES AND SPACE PROGRAM SPINOFF

CHAPTER

I

PRESENT PATENT POLICY AND ITS LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1953 estab-

lished

a

civilian space agency (NASA) whose primary purpose

is to carry on space activities which are ’’devoted to peace-

ful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” 1

activities which promote the public good on

a

Aside from

project by pro-

ject basis, such as launching weather and earth resources

satellites, there exists another important area in which space

science is meant to promote the public good, that is, through
the transfer to the civilian sector of "space age” technology.

NASA has emphasized such space program "fallout” as biomedical

sensors and a tough inorganic paint as examples of how money
spent on the space program is actually of most benefit "down

here on earth.”

NASA’s technology transfer operations are basically

oriented towards use of the patent system.

General Counsel for Patent Matters heads

NASA’s Assistant

division which

a

implements the patent policy established for NASA by Section
305 of the 195^ NASA Act, while NASA’s Office of Technology

Utilization tries to interest private industry in space

1 National

Vol

.

Aeronautics and Space Act

XL1I, sec. 2L51 (1958).

,

U.S. Code,
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program technology by offering royalty-free
licenses to NASA
patents and also by operating information
dissemination programs.

No attempt is made by these divisions
to recover the

government’s research and development investment.

While NASA’s

technology transfer activities are quite advanced
in comparison
to other government agencies, this has not
secured NASA
from

criticism; on the contrary both private industry and
those

concerned about the "giveaway’’ aspects of technology transfer
have censured NASA, although for differing reasons.

The fact

that NASA in some instances retains title to inventions arising from its research and licenses them, while in other in-

stances allows its contractors to take title, could be interpreted as showing a lack of overall policy concerning space

program spinoff.

Indeed, the patent organization’s activities

sometimes conflict with those of the Office of Technology Utilization when the rights to a certain invention are in doubt.
The space agency’s seeming confusion of practices regarding

technology transfer is not surprising, however, when one recognizes that innovation itself is not well understood, and
that even our patent system, which is as old as the Reoublic,
has been a center of controversy since its inception.
The results of a Denver Research Institute study have

added more fuel to the technology transfer disputes by indi-

cating that the major economic impact of space research does
not take the form of discrete inventions but consists of gen-

eral advances in technology which defy quantification, and

2#

are hard to attribute to the
space program alone.
Such issues
as whether or not the government
should claim the rights to
its research inventions, and how
much control, if any, it should

exert over the fruits of its science
programs are at the heart
of the patent policy dispute, but
also apply to the problem of

technology transfer as a whole.

An examination of NASA's pat-

ent policies should indicate the present
state of government
action regarding this problem, since NASA's
technology transfer
activities could well serve as a prototype for
many other gov-

ernment agencies.

Section 305 of the NASA Act of 195# ostensibly
deals
with NASA’s "Property Rights in Inventions" which
arise from
its contract research projects.

Unfortunately, the Section

fails to indicate whether the government should generally
claim title to patentable inventions (this is called "title

policy

)

,

or whether the contractors should be allowed in most

cases to reserve exclusive patent rights to inventions (this
is called "license policy," i.e.

the government is automatic-

ally allowed to hold licenses, but not exclusive patent rights,
to inventions arising from NASA funded contracts).

Section 305

came about as a result of industry and Patent Bar unhappiness

with the original NASA patent policy, which legislative records
show was to be patterned after that of the Atomic Energv Commission.

The AEC’s patent policy requires that the government

take title to atomic energy research inventions, because such

inventions are thought to have security implications.

In 195#,

When the NASA Act was passed,
the Soviet Union aooeared
to
pose a space-bound threat
to the U.S. -space oatents
seemed
to have great military
importance. But the
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DOD had a lic-

ense policy which did not
apoear to interfere with
national
security, and many members of
Congress felt that needed
space work would not be accomplished
because of the objections of NASA contractors to
title policy.
As a result of
these considerations and pressures,
a hybrid patent oolicy
was adopted in which both titles
and licenses would be taken at the discretion of the NASA
Administrator.
The "Property Rights in Inventions"
portion (Section
305)

of the 1958 NASA Act can be summarized
as follows:

The space agency can claim title to
any inventions which
arise from NASA contract work, whether
or not such inventions
were anticipated in the contract, and
whether or not the in-

ventor had been directly engaged in work on

a

NASA contract.

The main determining factor in the
government’s right to make
a claim to title is that the government
has contributed in

some way to the bringing about of the invention,
be it through
the use of government funds, facilities, or materials.

These

provisions have been criticized by some as allowing NASA in

theory to make a claim on virtually any invention with space
applications, no matter how remotely connected with
contract.

a

NASA

However, up to the present time NASA has shown no

inclination to '’raid” private business for their soace patents.

Every NASA contractor is required by the NASA Act to
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make a prompt and full disclosure
in writing of all new technology arising from contract work.
Part of the purpose of
this clause is to assure that space
technology be made available to all who can use it, and
not be held in the thrall of
NASA contractors.
Unfortunately, because of the nature of

technology transfer, laws alone may not be
capable of achieving this goal of diffusion; technology
tends to concentrate
where it originates.
In other words, new technology seems
to stay in the labs and companies where
it is invented, un-

less they decide to spread it.

Also,

NASA has been accused

of not fully living up to the intent of the
disclosure clause:

&dwin Hoyt in his book The Space Dealers states that NASA
has
used its security classification privilege to protect

its con-

tractors from "business espionage. "2

Section 305 goes on to say that
a

claim to an invention arising from

contractor may make

a

a

NASA contract and can

be granted a patent if the NASA Administrator waives the gov-

ernment’s rights to the invention.
a claim to the invention,
a Board of

If the Administrator makes

the conflict can be resolved before

Patent Interferences, and can be appealed to the

Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by either the Administrator or the contractor.

It should be noted that given NASA’s

broad powers to claim rights to an invention, a strong expres-

sion of interest in it by the Administrator would tend to

2 Edwin

P. Hoyt, The Space Dealers
Company, 1971), p. 55.

,

(New York:

John Day

3
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discourage a legal action on the
part of the contractor.
If
a patent is granted to a
contractor, and if within five
years
the NASA Administrator has
reason to believe that the contractor has engaged in any deception
in acquiring the
catent, the

patent can be reassigned to the
government, subject to the ar>peals procedures cited above.
NASA is, however, unlikely to
enter into such recall proceedings since
it does not even enter
into patent infringement cases, nor
do most other government
agencies.
It is estimated that about fifty
percent of all government patents are illegally infringed uDon,
but go unchallenged, because it is government practice
not to prosecute

infringers

.

Probably the most controversial part of Section
305 is
subsection F which deals with waivers. The only
guidance
offered the NASA Administrator in granting waivers is
that
such grants must be in the "public interest."

This, of course,

forces the Administrator to set NASA’s patent policy in
the

key area of taking titles vs. licenses.

While an examination

of the legislative history of the NASA Act indicates that a

hybrid policy was to be followed, there is nothing in the Act
itself that says this.

It appears that the framers of this

legislation tried very hard to "steer

a

middle course" regarding

3U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, An Evaluation of the Patent Policies of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Committee Print, prenared
ior the National Aeronautics and Snace Administration by the Department of Economics, the George Washington University’, Rerort
of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, $9th Cong., 2nd.
sess., 1966, (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office,
1966)
p. AO.
,

,
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patent policy, which is an area that
tends to demand "either°r
decisl °ns
The result was that no clear patent
policy
was established.
It was only due to subsequent
controversy
that NASA's patent policy became clearer,
although it is still
ratner entangled.
It should be pointed out, however,
that even
when the Administrator takes title, the
contractor is automatically granted a non-exclusive royalty-free
license; thus the
'

.

contractor is at no time barred from using commercially
an
invention resulting from his work for NASA, the only
difference
is whether or not he obtains exclusive rights
to market the

invention.

The NASA Act also allows the Administrator to set

up regulations concerning licenses granted to non-contractors.

After the 1958 NASA Act was passed, NASA promulgated its

regulations relating to waiver and licensing policy.

The wai-

ver regulations eventually generated more interest than any
other aspect of NASA’s founding.

NASA's Administrator, in

cooperation with his staff of patent counsels, established

a

policy in which waivers would be granted in all but exceptional cases.

policy."

This was, in other words, a pro-contractor, "license
In those instances when NASA takes title,

would be granted to interested businesses on

non-exclusive basis.

a

licenses

royalty-free,

If a patent owned by NASA fails to be

licensed after two years, an exclusive license may be granted.

Although NASA's patent policy was at this point very pro-contractor, there existed among contractors

isfaction with it.

a

residue of dissat-

Having to file petitions for waivers or
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exclusive licenses involves much
administrative work, and many
of NASA's aerospace contractors
were accustomed to the patent
policy of the DOD, whose license policy
is much more forthright.
NASA's patent policy was still open
to changes at this
time, however, since it was somewhat
interim
in nature.

In the fall of 1962 NASA decided to
hold a public hear-

ing before it formalized a set of
definitive Patent Waiver Regulations.
NASA, it could be charged, tried to
limit those at-

tending the hearing to

a

particular type of group, for while

a

large number of government contractors and other
businesses,

who were mostly pro-license policy, were well
represented, the
presence of others was minimal.

This resulted mainly from the

scheduling of the hearing during the Christmas season,
when

many members of Congress return to their home districts.

Sena-

tor bstes Kefauver, who was at the hearing, summed up the
prob-

lem this way:

M

I

would certainly think that, since Congress has

set the policy with reference to patents, that to announce a

hearing after Congress is gone and to close it before they come
back would be a defiance of Congress that no agency should get
by with.

”4-

Senator Kefauver threatened to take the matter of

NASA’s pro-contractor patent policy before his Anti -Trust and

Monopoly Subcommittee unless NASA

scheduled another set

^Lawrence R. Caruso, "Inventions in Orbit: The Patent
Waiver Regulations of the National Aeronautics and SDace Administration Revisited," Howard Law Journal XII, 1966, o. 56.
,
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°f hearings during the next session of Congress
at which a

broader range of opinions could be heard.
to this demand.

NASA acquiesced

After the next hearing, at which many title

policy advocates were heard, NASA’s waiver regulations were

dropped in favor of the patent policy set ud by President
John Kennedy’s Patent Policy Memorandum of 1963

.

The licen-

sing regulations were kept, although they too in recent years
have come under scrutiny as the number of space program spin-

offs increases.
The JFK Patent Policy Memorandum of 1963 is adhered to

by NASA in its waiver practices.

The Memorandum has been

described as "the first attempt to establish

a

certain ration-

ale for allocating patent rights government-wide in accordance

with the public interest. "5

The Memorandum is not legally

binding on federal agencies, but NASA adopted it in full, perhaps to avoid any more disputation.

In what possibly can be

interpreted as an unhealthy imitation of NASA’s hybrid patent
policy, the Memorandum also establishes a mixed procedure re-

garding allocation of patent rights.

The government

may claim title under the following circumstances:

1.

(and NASA)
if the

invention was specifically designed for commercial use by the
general public, or government regulations will require it for

5harbridge House Inc., Government Patent Policy Study Final Report for the Federal Council on Science and Technology
Committee on Government Patent Policy^ (Boston: Harbridge House
Inc., 1968), "Vol. I, Preface, p. iii.

.
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public use,

2.

if the invention results from a
contract in

the field of public health and welfare,
3. if the invention

results from a field of research which is
new and primarily
supported by government (such as atomic energy),
and which
could become dominated by a contractor if he
is allowed to

retain title, 4. if the contract is of

a

supervisory or man-

agement type (such as General Electric’s supervision of
North
American Rockwell in the Apollo Program).

If the Durpose of

the contract is to develop items for primarily
government use,

or if the research builds upon existing knowledge or
technology which is directly related to a contractor’s commercial

position, then principal rights to inventions may vest with
the contractor. 6

The Memorandum goes on to state that if con-

tractors holding title do not bring their inventions into use

within three years after

a patent issues to them,

the govern-

ment can require the contractor to license the invention.
As was the

case with NASA’s original patent policy, the

JFK Memorandum has also received criticism; title and license

advocates each accuse it of leaning in the wrong direction,

either towards government or contractors.

The title advocates

seem to be on firmer ground, however: an exhaustive study of

government patent policy carried out for the Federal Council
on Science and Technology by Harbridge House Incorporated of

^Ibid

.

,

p.

2
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Boston, Massachusetts, has stated
that "the net result of
these operational patterns is that
the
’government
title’ criteria will aoply to very
few government sponsored
inventions, while the . .
’government license’ criteria
will apply to the great majority. "7
The license criteria
apply rather neatly to the source of most
government sponsored inventions, i.e. the Defense Department.
.

.

.

.

Perhaps it is an indication of the intractability
of
the patent policy question that the JFK
Memorandum seems more
to legitimate or ratify current agency patent
practice rather

than to establish new practices.

No government agency seems

to have radically altered its patent policy as a result
of
the Memorandum.

The Defense Department continues to liberally

grant titles to its contractors, while such ’’public service"

oriented agencies as the Department of Agriculture and the

Department of the Interior continue to take title, since their
research is aimed at producing items which are intended for
use by the general public.

It is unfortunately easy to get

the impression that this "government-wide" patent oolicy is

really only an attempt to reduce government-contractor friction by defining circumstances under which contractors may
take title in terms of the contractor's established commercial

position, rather than in terms of the substantive question of

whether government contractors should be allowed to remain the

? Ibid

.

,

p.

5
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major beneficiaries of government research
which the taxpayer,
and not he, has paid for.

Another important defect of the Memorandum’s patent
policy is that it requires rights to inventions to
be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis.

The Memorandum permits NASA to be

liberal in granting waivers, but it does not erase the petitioning process required by the NASA Act, indeed, it reinforces
it.

Petitions for waiver on NASA inventions are carefully studied
in order to assure that the contract meets the Memorandum’s

criteria cited above.

Although NASA allows advance waivers

covering all inventions arising from

a

contract, few contrac-

tors seek these blanket waivers, and NASA has rejected large

numbers on the grounds of poor preparation.

CHAPTER

II

NASA'S RECORD AS A GENERATOR OF SPINOFF:

A

POINT OF DISPUTE

Between 1963 and 1970 NASA has acquired
ownership of
438 patents arising from contracts while
acquiring licenses
(with title going to contractors) on
1
340.
This is
a

to-license ratio of about four to three.

title-

It is thought that

even more waivers would be granted if
contractors understood
NASa s willingness to be liberal with
its contractors concerning patents.
At least this is the conclusion of an
extensive
study of NASA’s patent policy carried out for
the Committee on

Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House of
Representatives

m
>vn

1966 by George Washington University.

This study, entitled

Evaluati on of the Patent Policies of the National Aeronau -

tics and Space Administration (and hereafter referred
to as
the "GWU report") generally argues that so few inventions

arising from NASA contracts have been commercially successful
that worry over license policy leading to economic concentra-

tion or monopolization is unfounded.

Such a conclusion could

be disturbing to those who have thought, perhaps as a result

of NASA press releases, that space research has provided a

^-Federal Council on Science and Technology, Annual
Report on Government Patent Policy, Combined December 1969
and December 1970
Washington, D C
UTS Government Printing Office 1971)
pp. 64 - 65
.

,

,

.

(

.

.

:

.
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cornucopia of technological spinoffs.

The GWU report needs

to be examined in more detail, however, before one can form
a

clear picture of the nature of NASA research and why so few

patentable devices have resulted from it.
One of the pitfalls of the patent policy dispute is that

patents tend to be overrated in comparison to other forms of

technological spillover, while the evidence indicates that
just the opposite should be the case.

The patent policy dis-

pute tends to be ideological in nature, mixing the practical

problem of maximizing technology transfer with political questions regarding the rights to inventions; such concerns are

justifiable but the patent policy controversy seems to feed

upon itself while drawing attention away from more complex
and more important forms of technology transfer.

The infor-

mation contained in the GWU report indicates that many other
factors in addition to whether or not a contractor holds exclusive rights to an invention affect the invention’s likelihood of achieving commercial success.

In fact, patent policy

seems to be of rather minor importance in comparison to the

nature of the invention itself as an incentive for commercial

exploitation.

Also, the administrative burden of deciding

patent rights is a heavy one; it seems to hamper technology

transfer without really halting ’’giveaways.

"

The GWU report

favors contractor rights to government-sponsored inventions
but it tries to avoid ideological questions by basing its

arguments on the ostensibly low value of NASA inventions.

U0

It is perhaps worth noting that the
House Committee on Science

and Astronautics also favors a license policy.

The

GiVU

report begins with a statement of patent policy

goals: 1. the advancement of technology,

agency mission, and
ment.

3.

2.

the promotion of

promotion of other goals of

t he

govern-

These goals can be achieved, the authors of the
report

feel, through a patent policy which pushes government
sponsored inventions into the stream of commerce as quickly as
pos-

sible.

Under the heading of "advancement of technology" pat-

ent policy can aid such specific aims as disclosure of inven-

tions, utilization of inventions, encouragement of development
of inventions, and the transfer of technology.

In terms of

the promotion of agency mission patent policy can affect such

aims as getting the best contractors, and protection in pro-

curement (from having to later pay royalties on government

sponsored inventions).

Finally, patent policy can contribute

to other goals of the government such as protection of health

and welfare and avoidance of economic concentration and monopoly.
It should be noted that both title and license proponents

have argued that their patent policies will largely fulfill
the above goals, especially the first group under "advancement
of technology."

This conflict is directly traceable to a basic

difference of opinion regarding the goals of the patent system
itself.

The value of exclusive rights as an incentive to in-

vention is the issue; while some people feel this is the heart

u
of the patent system and indeed any workable
system for fos-

tering invention, others believe exclusive rights
to be outmoded and a hindrance to the widest possible utilization
of

inventions.

NASA’s patent program is based on the former

argument, while the activities of NASA’s Office of Technology

Utilization seem to be founded on the latter.

The GWU report’s

statement of preference for a license policy causes the report
to be of questionable objectivity;
the

it tends to treat as closed

very question which is at the heart of the patent policy

controversy.
The GNU authors’ central argument is that since NASA

inventions have not found any substantial commercial market,
the incentive value of granting patents to contractors is both

needed and not harmful.

The authors state that only ten per-

cent of all government patents have found commercial use.^
It should be pointed out, however,

that the main source for

such patent utilization information is industry itself.

Later

in the GWU report the authors concede that companies could

conceal information on profits derived from government sponsored inventions.

expressed

a

It is a fact that business has consistently

desire to retain title whenever patent policy leg-

islation is debated.

This was its attitude during the contro-

versy over NASA’s waiver regulations.

Edwin Hoyt in his book

^u.S. Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policies of NASA
p.

6.

,
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Th e Space Dealers has reported that
North American Rockwell,
NASA’s prime contractor on the Apollo
Program, has profited
greatly from government work; in the private
sector it has

grown to become the nation’s fourth largest
auto parts manufacturer.
Hoyt attributes a large part of this growth
to
technology transfer from government research and
develonment
contracts; he quotes Willard F. Rockwell, Chairman
of the

Board of North American Rockwell as saying "Technology
transfer,

in brief,

is the flow of advanced knowledge,

skills,

pro-

cesses, and devices between the company’s groups and
divisions

for profitable use in broader markets.

"3

Thompson

-

Ramo

-

Woodbridge (TRW Inc.) is another company which started out as
Primarily a government contractor but which has since diversified into a broad range of fields (including auto parts,

where it has achieved

a

dominant position).

Hoyt quotes

a

TRW brochure as saying that TRW is "a diversified technology company, whose scientific and manufacturing talents contribute importantly to the growth of several major industries."^"
It seems evident that private industry does not strictly div-

ide the spinoff effect of government R+D into those which will

be patentable, and those which will not; thus discussing snin-

off strictly in terms of patents, as the GWU renort does, seems

3Hoyt, Space Dealers

^Ibid .

,

p.

143.

,

pp.

141-142.

likely to give a misleading impression of the value of soace
program research to the private economy.
One of the implications of following a license or title

patent policy could be that each may set a certain pattern

for the disposition of transferred technology as a whole.

It

is possible that this has already happened, for the government

has generally followed a license policy in the past (in terms
of numbers of inventions), and there has concurrently been no

effort on the part of the government to claim rights to nonpatentable forms of spinoff.

Present government science nol-

icy exercises little control and appears to evidence insuffi-

cient concern over the results of its research once that re-

search is completed; in terms of technology transfer private

industry alone determines the nongovernmental uses to which
spinoff is put.

It should be noted that patent policy merely

determines the degree of exclusivity with which

a

company may

commercially exploit a government sponsored invention;

it can-

not regulate which inventions are picked for development.

It

is quite possible that many government inventions of great

potential have not been marketed because they need more devel-

opment than industry is willing to give them, or because they

will not turn a quick profit.
If space program technology is not to rest entirely in

the hands of NASA contractors who may or may not desire to

use it, then a well functioning technology disclosure program
is a necessity.

Although NASA contractors are required by

^

u
law to disclose all new technology
arising from space contracts, their disclosure record is a
rather poor one.
The

report's authors feel that the disclosure
record could
be better if the contractors had
a better incentive to disclose, such as possession of a clear
right to any inventions
arising from the contract.
"It is common knowledge that commercial research yields far more invention
disclosures than
does research by and for the government . "5 This
is partly
G//U

because commercial labs do research tailored to
commercial

demands (it does not mean that the quality of
government research is inferior), and partly because companies
doing their
own research have active programs aimed at disclosure.

Gov-

ernment contractors are not very vigilant regarding disclosure
of spinoffs when the rights to them are in doubt; the
govern-

ment and private research activities of these contractors are

divided so that the government can make no legal claim to private research inventions.

NASA operates a program by which

its in-house researchers (whose inventions automatically be-

come the property of NASA) and also its contractor researchers

may receive cash awards for valuable disclosures, but NASA's
contractor disclosure record remains poor.

NASA's disclosure

rate (including its in-house research) is lower than the overall government rate: 0.61 disclosures per million dollars spent
on a contract versus 0.99 for all government agencies.

5u.S. Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policies of NASA
p.

11.
6 lbid.,

p.

17.

,
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NASA's in-house disclosure rate
is 20 to 30 percent higher
than that of its contractors. 9

Because much of NASA’s research is either
ahead of its
time or consists of reliability
improvements which do not result
innovations per se few inventions of immediately
evident commercial potential are produced.
Better channels of

m

,

communication probably account for NASA’s superior
in-house
disclosure rate, although the GWU authors note
that "Conceivably, contractors could channel some of their
best inventions
so as to keep them out of the government’s
clutches, and would

mostly disclose inventions of no particular interest
to themselves.”

Another factor which could account for the Door con-

tractor disclosure rate is low patent sensitivity.

Some indus-

tries, such as aerospace, do not rely on the use of oatents
to
a great degree;

their manufacturing activities involve the com-

bination of many individual parts over which legal disputes can
be a nuisance.

The aerospace industry has long practiced exten-

sive cross-licensing agreements and patent protection is often

not sought for aerospace inventions.

The GWU authors estimate

that the aerospace industry holds one-eighth as many Datents
as other comparably large industries. 9

7 Ibid.,

p.

17.

^Ibid

.

,

p.

2A.

9 Ibid.

,

p.

22.
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that the importance of patent policy
is variable according to
the kind of industry doing government
research, but the problem of technology transfer to non-contractors
and civilian

business remains acute.
NASA’s disclosure problem seems subject to
three possible
solutions. More contractor rights can be allowed,
as the GWU

report suggests, although this reinforces the contractor’s
position as the major beneficiary of government R+D
The govern.

ment can be more strict in enforcing disclosures, and
perhaps
set up a program aimed at developing civilian uses for
govern-

ment-wide R+D spinoff, which would be an interesting science

program in itself.

Finally, the government could simply

cut

back on its research programs which do not seem to have much
value to the civilian economy, i.e. military and space research.
The key question is: what is the ultimate value of military
and space research?

The evidence is that those research uro-

grams which receive the most funds, such as military and space
research, produce the most spinoff, at least in terms of raw

volume, although it can be argued that other lines of research
are more fruitful in terms of dollars spent.

According to

Federal Council on Science and Technology (FCST) figures, NASA
has received 21,877 invention disclosures between 1963 and
Of these only 1,555 have resulted in patents. 1 ^

1970.-^

IOpqst, Annual Report on Government Patent Policy
50-51.
pp.
11

lb id

.

,

pp.

54-55, 64-65.

,

hi
In comparison with other government
agencies, NASA has filed

patent applications on about 10 percent of its
disclosures
while "public service" agencies such as the
Department of

Agriculture filed h9 percent and the Department of
the Interior,

37 percent. 12

The value of NASA patents seems further diminished
when

one examines their utilization record.

The GWU report states

that most of NASA's patents are utilized by NASA
itself or

other government agencies.

Civilian utilization can come about

either through waivers or licenses granted by NASA.

Of patents

available for licensing, about 10 percent are licensed, and of
those roughly 20 percent achieve commercial utilization. 11

Several reasons account for this low utilization with patent
policy playing an apparently minor role.

In answer to a GWU

report questionnaire, a few companies holding non-exclusive

licenses stated that exclusive rights would have enhanced their
utilization, but

a

greater proportion felt that "NASA's pat-

ented inventions are not commercialized because the inventions
have government applications only." 1 ^

Other reasons cited

for non-utilization were: insufficient market demand, suoerior substitutes, technology which is too sonhisticated

ficient time elapsed for an invention to find

12 Ibid.,

pp.

a use,

,

insuf-

and high

102 - 103 .

Congress, Evaluation of Patent Policy of NASA
pp. 31,

35

.

u Ibid.,

p.

39.

,

development costs.

It should be remembered,

however, that

only invention usage is being discussed
here, and the imDortance of NASA's patentable inventions is
probably minimal,
as the Denver Research Institute report
(which will be dis-

cussed later) indicates.

The value of overall sDace technol-

ogy is more difficult to ascertain.

Most of NASA's inventions which find their way into
the
private sector do so through the operation of the waiver

doI-

icy.

uf course,

contractors.

the granting of waivers is limited to NASA

The GWU report's authors interpret the legisla-

tive history of the patent provisions of the NASA Act to in-

dicate that a "flexible" patent policy was to be followed

wnicn would provide a balance between the needs of government
and the preservation of incentives to use NASA spinoff.

In

accordance with this, NASA ostensibly is to retain the rights
to "major" inventions, while "humdrum" inventions were to be

made the object of the incentives of the patent system.
a

Such

policy towards the disposition of rights to government spon-

sored inventions indicates the lack of resolution of the basic

patent policy dispute, for if patent incentives are the best

way to achieve the transfer of inventions to the private sector,
one wonders why this logic should not apply to all NASA inven-

tions.

It is interesting to note that the government's legal

right to spinoff inventions is

a

strong one: in the private

sector those who pay for research have

a

common law right to

inventions resulting from it, yet the GWU authors seem to deny

U9

this right to the government.

They argue that the taxpayer

pays only once for spinoff inventions
when bought from a private company which holds a patent to them
because spinoff is
an unforeseen and unplanned aspect to research.
This seems

tantamount to saying that taxpayer interest in
government
science programs should be limited strictly to
the goals of

particular contracts; the license policy argument by
implication defines ’’government science” very narrowly while
at the
same time the government has been treating it broadly as
a

great source of spinoff beneficial to the public as

a whole.

Petitions for patent waivers are evaluated by NASA’s
Inventions and Contributions Board

(

ICB

)

with great care.

Under the guidelines of the JFK Memorandum the waiver petitioners must clearly show that their acquisition of title will
not lead to their dominance of a particular field of technol-

ogy and that acquiring title is really necessary for marketing
the invention.

The former proviso can cause problems for small

business contractors since these companies are often one-product
oriented.

This is another example of lack of consistency in

NASA's patent policies because the small contractors are more

likely than the big contractors to try to put on the civilian

market inventions arising out of their government contract
work.

The JFK Memorandum provisos may seem harsh, but the ICB

has been quite willing to grant waivers, usually turning con-

tractors down on the average only two out of ten cases of

.

.
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petitions for individual inventions

15

The NASA Administra-

tor makes the final decision on
waivers, and he usually agrees
with the findings of the IGB
The JFK Memorandum provisos embody the
drawback of being

rather subjective.

The GWU report enumerates four problems

which are embodied in the decision making
process regarding
waivers: 1. definition of ’‘field of technology”

(which osten-

sibly should not be dominated by any one company)
is difficult
since fields of technology overlap and boundaries
are everchanging; this tends to favor the granting of waivers,
2. the legal

rights of non-profit contractors are hard to establish
because
the JFK Memorandum does not speak of them as
’’contractors” al-

though much work is done for NASA by universities and "think
tanks”; it appears that only profit making companies qualify
as waiver holders, 3« the operation of the waiver policy is

very time-consuming: on the average it takes ten months to
process a waiver petition (to eventually acquire a patent may

easily take three years or more), 4. the activities of the
Office of Technology Utilization, which operates the licensing
program, sometimes conflict with the operations of the patent
branch.

The OTU makes public through its various publications

information on various NASA spinoff devices and processes; it
does not wait until contractors have selected the inventions
in which they are interested and leave the chaff for the

-^ Ibid

.

f

p.

66.

^
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licensing program.

Thus it sometimes happens that OTU
publi-

cizes a device for licensing which is
also involved in a contractor waiver petition. The GWU report
states that the contractor response to the waiver program has
been sluggish, which
is not surprising considering its
complexity. The GWU report
states that NASA has an undeserved reputation
for being unwilling to grant waivers which a public relations
project could
remedy, but it is difficult to see how contractors
could be

encouraged to petition for waivers given the ever-increasing
time needed to process them under the government’s present

program to regulate patent policy in the public interest.

Such NASA contractors as General Electric, Westinghouse

,

RCA,

and General Telephone and Electronics rank among the top pro-

ducers of new inventions each year.^-6

It is hard to believe

that these innovative companies do not create many inventions

under NASA contracts.

How many of these inventions circuit-

ously find their way into a contractor’s commercial business
is unfortunately difficult to determine.

By the GWU report’s measurements 11.5 percent of NASA

waivers have been commercially utilized, while 60 percent have
government usefulness

.

The commercial potential of NASA in-

ventions tends to increase over time; few inventions regardless

l6 lbid.

17 Ibid

.

,

pp.

68,

71.
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of their source achieve quick use.

Often a patent exoires on

an invention before it achieves
commercial importance.

This
must be recognized when studying NASA’s
utilization record.
In terms of development costs of
waived inventions, the GWU
report found that they were about evenly
divided between low
(under $5,000), medium ($5,000 to
$50,000), and high ($50,000
and up).
Thus it cannot be said that NASA inventions
are al-

ways so exotic that only much development
work which must be
covered by exclusive patent rights for contractors,
will bring
the inventions into the commercial market. The
GWU rerort con-

cludes that there is little evidence that NASA
contractors have

made great profits on NASA waivers; to the end of
1965, the

companies holding waivers had spent more on development than

they had received in sales revenue.

The authors of the GWU

report note that, while they do not think it probable,
all we know, some business firm might

.

.

.

M

For

conceal from public

knowledge the large profits it has been making from one of
these inventions.
A
T

’is the

”^-9

fundamental problem inhibiting transfer of technology
almost universal segregation [from the commercial

sector J of government-financed research and development.” 20

l B Ibid

p.

75.

1 9lbid.,

p

.

87 .

2 Q Ibid

p.

90.

.

.

.

,
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In the rush of NASA work inventions can be
"lost" because of

poor disclosure practices.

But the license policy recommended

by the GWU authors seems likely to reinforce this
segregation,

because it minimizes the government’s responsibility towards
the fruits of its science programs.

Perhaps what is needed

in the space program is a system of Research Associations like

those in Great Britain in which government and business both

contribute to research activities; as the space program matures,
more and more of its research will be of a practical nature;
a

way will need to be found to acknowledge the taxpayer’s in-

vestment.

Unfortunately, the establishment of Comsat as

a

private, profit-making corporation (which still depends on

NASA research for hardware and techniques) shows that the gov-

ernment’s research role and contribution is still being ignored.

CHAPTER

III

NASA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES

NASA’S Technology Utilization Program, and the
activities of the Science and Technology Information Division

represent the most advanced post R+D operations conducted
by any government agency.

Their existence is

a

recognition

that the patent system alone may not be adequate to the
tech-

nology transfer problem.

TUP not only licenses NASA inven-

tions but also promotes other forms of NASA technology.

Although TUP is meant to serve the private sector, the same

segregation between government and business tends to be present in the TUP approach, which is an ex post facto one.

There is evidence that technology transfer occurs best when
a company has great familiarity with that technology, which

usually arises only when the company carries on the research
itself.

Nevertheless the Office of Technology Utilization

is faced with the task of trying to match up aspects of NASA

technology with possible non-contractor business uses.

Also,

the technology evaluation process is carried on by NASA per-

sonnel, who are probably not in a very good position to anti-

cipate the needs of various private companies.
In an article called "The Technological Impact of the

U.S. Space Program" by Clotaire Wood

(NASA European Reore-

sentative) the activities of the Office of Technology
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Utilization, under which the Technology
Utilization Division
and the Science and Technology
Information Division operate,
are described as follows: "The
program is designed to shorten the time between the development
and use of new knowledge;
aid the movement of this knowledge
across industry, discinlinary, and regional boundaries; stretch
the returns from
aerospace research dollars by finding
additional uses for
the results; and develop better ways
of communicating and

applying government generated technology in the
private economy." 1 The statement indicates that unlike
the license
policy advocates, the people in the OTU do not define
government science narrowly; their activities constitute
an ambitious five million dollar a year program aimed at bringing
the fruits of space research to a wide cross-section of
the

economy.
The TUP program works as follows:

Specialists called

Technology Utilization Officers (TUO) work in major NASA
field installations reviewing R+D (both in-house and con-

tractor-disclosed) for promising new ideas.

Reports from

the field centers filed by the TUO are evaluated at NASA

headquarters and also by independent research institutes.
Inventions or technology which appear promising are announced in various TUP publications.

Which publication is chosen

British Scientific Instrument Research Association,
Innovation for Profit (London: Adam Hilger Ltd., 1963),
,

p.

T36.
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depends on the nature of the innovation and
how much description it needs.
"Tech Brief" is the most commonly used
publication.

Since 196S more than two thousand issues of

Tech Brief have been published describing
such NASA spinoff
as a new brushless DC electric motor, low
cost insulation

for pipes carrying very cold liquids, improved
fuel cells,
a

leakproof valve for corrosive chemicals, and an almost

frictionless alloy.

These NASA publications are distributed

to industry, universities, research institutes, the trade

and business press, and libraries at no charge.

The OTU

f

s

Science and Technology Information Division

deals with the volume of information which cannot be handled

through TUP publications.

STID operates the "Regional Dis-

semination Centers" (RDC) which contain computerized files
on space program technology.

A

business can subscribe (at

the cost of a service charge) to an RDC service by which

NASA files are periodically scanned for information of 00 ssible use to that business.

In one six month period, NASA

employees scanned with computer help 63,000 abstracts for
Ball Brothers Company of Muncie, Indiana; 153 abstracts were

found useful to the company.

As of 1969,

RDC’s held lists

of 700,000 abstracts and were adding 6,000 reports a month.

Edwin Hoyt, author of The Space Dealers

,

notes that

by virtue of the great volume of research results that come
out of NASA, the activities of the OTU inevitably involve

NASA in general business affairs.

And this appears to be
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true regardless of disputes over the worth of space
tech-

nology as

a

whole to the commercial market.

Yet it should

be noted that this involvement is rather one-sided;
govern-

ment and private industry as a whole really do not interact.
Glotaire

Vyood

notes that OTU is mainly concerned with spread-

ing "the incremental advances that singly seem of minor im-

portance, but which in combination are the foundation of our

industrial strength. "2

This is

a

laudable activity but

there may be no substitute for the familiarity and understanding of a certain field of technology which comes about through

contract work.

It would seem likely that the same worries

which plague the title advocates about

a

liberal patent doI-

icy should also apply to the non-patentable technology, but

this latter form of spinoff for some reason seems to have

been left out of the ongoing debate on NASA patent policies
and their implications.

Perhaps it is felt that non-patent-

able spinoff is very difficult to channel or control, which
is probably true,

and which is all the more reason to estab-

lish a government“business relationship in the conduct of

government science that recognizes contractors as the Dri-

mary beneficiaries.
The innovation evaluation systems of both the patent

branch and the OTU are
fer process.

2 lbid.,

a

key element in the technology trans-

Not all new technology disclosed by contractors

p.

190.

5$

is considered sufficiently important to
warrant filing a

patent application or promotion by the OTU, thus
tion process must take place.

a

selec-

If a NASA researcher (or con-

tractor researcher) creates an innovation which he
thinks
has commercial potential, he notifies his supervisor
accor-

dingly.

If the researcher fails to recognize the commercial

potential the invention could be lost unless someone at

later time reviews his work thoroughly.

a

The supervisor re-

views the disclosure and fills out an official NASA evaluation form asking him his opinion of its novelty, oerformance,
and potential government and/or commercial applications.

This evaluation is termed a "technical'’ one by NASA, but it
is hard to understand how opinions on commercial usefulness

can be purely technical.
In the patent branch this "technical” evaluation is

forwarded to the local NASA Patent Counsel who studies the

disclosure and gives it a "P-1" rating, which means that
the disclosure appears to warrant filing a patent applica-

tion, or a "P-2" rating, which indicates that the disclosure

will be held on a stand-by status until more information on
it can be sent,

or a "P-3" rating, which means that the dis-

closure does not warrant patenting.

It can be argued that

neither NASA scientists nor its legal personnel are partic-

ularly well qualified to evaluate market potential.

The

local patent counsel is asked to judge whether the disclosed

invention is 1. of primary importance to aeronautical or
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space activities (in which case NASA may wish
to retain
title to it), or 2. a ’’pioneer discovery,” or

3.

a

substan-

tial advancement of the art, or 4. the subject
of existing
or prospective government production or use,
or

5.

an inven-

tion with substantial promise of commercial utility,-^

Posi-

tive findings on these criteria will warrant patenting
of
the disclosed invention.

The local Patent Counsel priority

rating is then reviewed at NASA headquarters by the Office
of the Assistant General Counsel for Patent matters.

If

the decision is made to file a patent application with the
U.S.

Patent Office NASA will proceed to file, unless a con-

tractor files a petition for waiver, in which case the In-

ventions and Contributions Board and the NASA Administrator
will determine the rights to the invention according to the
’’public interest."
A

selection process must also take place in the Technol

ogy Utilization Program since it is impossible to nublish in-

formation on all NASA technology.

Although it is the goal of

the OTU to achieve "the widest possible dissemination to the

public of information regarding the agency’s new technology,

letting industry itself select the items in which it is inter

ested,”^ only the RDC’s really tap the total information

^Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study,

Vol • III,

8.

p.

^Ibid

.

,

p.

9.

,
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reservoir, and even in that operation NASA
personnel must

intervene between the company and the spinoff
information.
In the TUP program the Technology Utilization
Offi cer as-

signed to local NASA field installations reviews
disclosures
and prepares "flash sheets" on interesting items.

He too,

like his patent branch counterpart, must decide on

a

sure’s "commercial potential."

disclo-

His flash sheet, along with

any needed supporting documentation, is sent to an "evalua-

ting institution," either a consulting firm or

a

university,

which is also to determine commercial potential.

The eval-

uating institution returns the disclosure to NASA in

lishability category."

a "pub-

The TUO reviews this evaluation and

sends it and the disclosure along to the Operations Branch

Chief of the Technology Utilization Division for

a

final

decision on publication.
Two things need to be noted about this process; first,
the initial evaluation is probably the most important one,

yet as the Harbridge House report says, "In practice, however,

this initial evaluation is largely subjective and the

result of admittedly personal opinion. "5

And secondly,

"commercial potential," like the eventual value of

a

patent,

is one of the greatest imponderables in the technology trans-

fer process.

^

Ibid

It appears that NASA has great faith in its

.

p.

9.

.
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evaluating personnel and their "technical"
approach to the
problem for, to quote the Harbridge House
report again,

"At no point does the evaluating
process accroach a market
survey, including such factors as costs,

engineering esti-

mates, market potential, and so forth.

There is agreement

within the Office of Technology Utilization
that public funds
should not be expended for this purpose. "6
Again
there ap-

pears a lack

of

consistency in NASA concerning spinoff: tech-

nological spillover is "given away," but

a

market survey,

which could be quite useful in making the value of
certain
NAoA inventions or technology evident to businesses, espec-

ially non-contractors, is shied away from because of scrucles
about public funds.

The OTU speaks of making scace program

technology available to the "public" yet present government
patent policies limit the granting of licenses by contractors
to "responsible" applicants

(probably other businesses) cap-

able of utilizing government inventions.?

It

is as if no one

wants to recognize that spinoff will be used to make money
and profits.

An innovation can be promoted by the patent branch,

or the OTU, or both.

Theoretically these promotional activi-

ties are to be coordinated at the local level, but if they
are not,

"they are simply not coordinated at all, which

6Ibid

.

,

p.

9

?FCST, Annual ReDort on Government Patent Policy,
p.

157.
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sometimes

happens." 8

Aside from the problem of differing

underlying philosophies regarding the value
of exclusive
rights to inventions as an incentive to
bring
them into

use, which route is picked at the local
level for promotion
of an invention can result "purely and
simply because dif-

ferent people’s knowledge of the state of the art
differs." 9
In other words,

a Technology Utilization Officer may recog-

nize commercial potential where
or vice versa.

ment or

a

a

Patent Counsel does not,

Like determinations as to whether the govern-

contractor should get patent rights, determinations

over which innovations are picked for publicizing are depen-

dent on many subjective criteria which NASA people working
at the local level may not be able to cope with adequately.

NASA also engages in less formal technology transfer

activities such as symposia and person-to-person contacts

between government and industry scientists which in the
long run could be quite effective because they afford the

observation of NASA research Projects on

a

more intimate,

step-by-step basis, similar to the kind of familiarity that
a

contractor scientist has with

a space

project.

The activ-

ities of the OTU are necessarily focused on end-products,

,b

Vol

.

Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study,

Ill,

p.

9 Ibid.

10.
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and to quote the Harbridge House
Study:

’’NASA’s role is lar-

gely reactive in terms of finding firms
to practice NASA owned
inventions.
After promotion of inventions, NASA
relies on interested parties to request licenses.” 10
There is evidence
that the publication of information on
an innovation, which is
one of the major functions of the patent
system,

is often not

enough to bring about interest in and use of
an invention.

To

the extent that the OTU programs mirror this
publication func-

tion (except that it applies to technology and
not just inventions], the programs may suffer from the same
kind of inadequacy.

The effectiveness of the OTU program is difficult
to determine, as is the value to the economy of space technology
as a whole.

There are, of course, many individual examnles of

of effective technology transfer into the civilian market.

Glotaire Wood cites the following examples of TUP insDired tech-

nology transfer: a TV picture enhancement technique developed
for the Mariner deep space probes is now being used to clarify

medical x-ray pictures.

RDC documents helped a company refine

its methods of growing crystals for industrial use and thus

helped the company to increase its sales by one hundred thousand

dollars

a year.

More than one hundred companies have expressed

interest in marketing a tough inorganic paint which NASA developed for its spacecraft.

A

discovery by NASA scientists that

hexagonal crystal structure provides

10 Ibid

.

t

p.

12.

a

superior bearing

material is being promoted by the TUP and is expected to
have great industrial and medical (in artificial joints)

applications.

Biomedical sensors developed for astronauts

are now used in many intensive care units in hospitals.

Unfortunately, while the citing of such transfer cases enhances the space program's image, it does not constitute

statistically significant presentation.

a

CHAPTER

IV

THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
The Denver Research Institute, operated by the Univer-

sity of Denver has carried out a study aimed at determining
the value of aerospace research to the rest of the economy.

This study, entitled The Commercial Applications of Missile /

Space Technology

,

reached the conclusion that because of the

nature of most technology transfer, it is extremely difficult
and perhaps impossible to fix a definite value on missile/

space technology.

The Denver study is useful in that its

findings undermine the use of the patent system as

a

primary

technology transfer device, and indicate that ex post facto
attempts to control space program "fallout" in the oublic interest may not work because of the great complexity of the

technology transfer process.
The Denver report states at the outset that its under-

taking has been in response to fears that too much money is

being spent on missile/space technology.

Thus its main effort

was to identify interactions between such technology and the

economy as a whole.

The report emphasizes that aerosnace and

Eleven "Major

non-aerospace technology are closely interwoven.

Findings and Conclusions" are cited in the report:

1.

Transfer

of technology has been by far the most important contribution
of missile/space technology to the economy.

2.

A

portion of
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the technology advanced by missile/space
programs has found,
and will continue to find application in
commercial industry
for non-aerospace purposes. 3 . A time-lag
exists between the

development of missile/space devices and processes
and their
commercial application, i.e. most commercial
applications have
yet to occur but are expected. A. Relatively little
importance
can be attached to direct transfer of specific
products (such
as those which are patentable).

"It is more accurate and mean-

ingful to consider missile/space contributions to the commercial sector of the economy in terms of the transfer of technol-

ogy rather than in terms of a transfer of products.
The fifth conclusion states that six types of contribu-

tion of missile/space technology are:
and applied science

a.

stimulus of basic

(addition to the basic store of knowledge),

b.

development of new or improved processes and techniques,

c.

improvement of existing products, i.e. development of better

quality and reliability in products is an important contribution of missile/space R+D

Further contributions are:

.

d.

in-

creased availability of advanced materials, testing equipment,
and laboratory equipment which can be used in non-aerosnace

activities, e. development of specific new products

-

these

are less significant in comparison to overall missile/snace

contributions because single devices are static whereas

The Commercial Applications
(Denver University of Denver,

^-Denver Research Institute,

of Missile/Space Technology
1963
p. v.
)

,

,

:
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technology has a wide range of applications,
and

duction

-

f.

cost re-

this is an often overlooked contribution:
soace work

can raise the volume of production to the
point where "exotic”
items become low cost, for example, solar cells.
Also, sDace

work has raised the level of management and production
techniques, which is a cost reduction contribution.

It should be

noted that few of these contributions can be easily channeled

either to or away from certain designated beneficiaries, such
as contractors or non-aerospace businesses.

The Denver report continues its list of conclusions as

follows: 6. Attribution of given technological advances to
one source is often impossible

interconnected for that.

7.

knowledge is too closely

-

It does not appear feasible to

measure in quantitative terms the economic impact of missile/
space technology.

3.

Insufficient understanding of the nature

of the transfer process seems to have led to widely divergent

opinions on the value of missile/space technology to the economy.

9.

Diffusion of secondary

(

non-aerosoace

)

uses is much

slower than diffusion of primary uses, with informal communication channels possibly playing
formal channels.

10.

a

more important role than

There are gaps between persons and or-

ganizations doing missile/space work and those companies canable of applying space technology commercially.

These gaos

exist even between divisions within the same company; in other

words specific lines of technology tend to concentrate where
they originate.

11.

Technology transfer and utilization are

.
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hampered by lack of understanding about how
technology is
applied at the level of the firm.
The foregoing points indicate that
evaluating the eco-

nomic importance of space research in terms
of specific products or discoveries does not take in all the
forms of contribution.
The technological contribution which is
incremental
and diffuse is probably more important.

The Denver report

even refuses to use the terms "spinoff" and "fallout"
feeling
that they tend to imply that missile/space technology
contri-

butions are only accidental or unimportant.

"To the contrary,

some instances of contribution from the missile/space effort
are expected, [and_] may prove to be of more significance than

their progenitor; and the possible commercial market is as
strong a motivation for their development as their more apparent missile/space market." 2

The report uses the term "contri-

bution" rather than "by-product": "The total contribution of

missile/space R+D to the commercial economy is broader, more
complex, more indirect, and more difficult to identify than
is generally realized. "3
If the government's investment in soace research is to

be recognized it seems that a form of dual investment, such
as occurs in the British Research Associations may be neces-

sary; if contractors complain that they do not make money on

2 Ibid

.

3lbid.

,

p.

1
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space spinoffs, then the government may
consider going into
the space business itself by doing more
in-house research
and refrain from turning space operations
(such as communica-

tion satellites systems) over to private enterprise.

If it

is true that space research is too specialized
to be of much

general use, then perhaps more funds should be placed
in other
fields of research.
It should be noted that a dual
funded

Research Association could also engage in studies aimed at
finding uses lor space devices here on earth, and non-contractors could also join this phase of the program for a fee.
The Denver Report investigated the information flow as-

pects of technology transfer, and as could be expected, the

originators of certain lines of technology, i.e. the contractors tend to be the first "recipients" of transfer.
to a survey,

In renly

"close customer contact" was cited by businesses

as the primary source of knowledge about space technology.

Other sources included technical and trade journals, meetings,
committees and symposia, literature search, and finally, patents.

Small companies not involved in the missile/space mar-

ket, when surveyed as to their opinions on how technology

transfer could be enhanced, cited first "easier access to
and prompter reporting of research results."

Many companies

asserted that they were satisfied with present information

transfer activities but a desire was expressed by others to
become involved in space work as contractors: these companies

wanted the government to make better known its desires and
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requirements in space contracts, to better
familiarize itself
with the capabilities of small businesses,
and to be generally
more willing to accept small concerns as
missile/soace contractors.

These latter companies perhaps recognize the
value of
"close customer contact.” To quote the Denver
reoort: "Exceot
in those instances where the same
organizational unit generates
the missile/space technology, and apolies this
technology
in

products it sells, it seems possible that there are
relatively
few cases of direct communication of technology
from original

innovator to final user or applier."

14
'

The Denver renort’s

authors state that technology is usually filtered, evaluated,
and otherwise relayed; the process is comnlex and is one
of

diffusion.

The authors suggest that the transmittal and receo-

tion of information on space technology is only one nart of the

technology transfer process, and both it and the whole diffusion
process are in need of basic research so that technology trans-

fer can be enhanced.
The Denver report does not judge the overall impact of

missile/space technology on the economy in quantitative terms
because such quantification is infeasible.

Space and non-snace

technology are closely interwoven; tracing a certain nroduct
or improvement back to a single source is often imnossible.

Determination of the amount of sales due to advances in s^ace
technology is a dubious undertaking, since the space technology

^Ibid

.

,

p.

17.

;
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contribution may take the form of improved quality
or better
management technique. Space technology’s impact on
the Gross
National Product is difficult to ascertain because its

secon-

dary and tertiary permutations fuse with other forms
of technology.

Time lag

militates against quantification; it is

estimated that at least five to ten years are needed for miss il e /space

technology to reach the commercial market, and by

that time its form may be substantially altered.

This is not

to say that the missile/space contribution is

insignificant;

on the contrary, the Denver report notes that

a

pattern of

contribution already exists and that bigger contributions are
expected as the technology diffuses into the economy.
The main points of Part Two can be summarized as follows:
1.

NASA’s technology transfer operations are oriented towards

patents yet the efficacy of the patent system as

transfer device is doubtful;

2.

a

technology

NASA's hybrid patent policy

is inconsistent and reveals a lack of resolution of basic is-

sues behind the title vs. license dispute; 3. the present NASA

patent policies are complicated, they probably discourage in-

terest in NASA inventions without really halting ’’giveaways"
4.

NASA patent policies and Office of Technology Utilization

operations necessarily focus on end-products while close association with

a

line of space technology which only contractors

achieve is probably the best way to understand and anticipate
the potential of that line of technology;

5.

NASA’s invention

evaluation processes are a poor substitute for the contractor’s
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advantage, and are plagued by many subjective criteria;
6.

a

segregation exists between government research and

its eventual non-government application

-

this segregation

could be remedied and technology transfer (and not just

invention transfer) enhanced in a Research Association

through which contractors and other interested businesses
would participate in developing civilian uses for snace
technology.

Since both business and government would con-

tribute financially to this program, the "giveaway" Droblem diminishes.

PART III

CONCLUSION

Ihe theoretical and factual data connected
with pre-

sent NASA patent policy seem to impel one to certain
con-

clusions about public policy making in this area which
fit
into the comprehensivist way of looking at things.

In order

to present these conclusions it would perhaps be useful
to

briefly recap the theoretical arguments presented in the
first part of this paper, and then cite the weaknesses of
NASA patent policy as it works out in practice.

It should

become apparent through doing this that incrementalism is

largely inappropriate in the realm of patent policy.
it should also be pointed out that comprehensivism

valuable, does not appear able to supply

a

,

Yet

while

perfect solution

to the problem of patent policy either.

To state the problem simply, there is no real NASA

policy over patent rights.

What does exist is a law cover-

ing NASA inventions which gives the NASA Administrator dis-

cretion to decide on patent rights, what also exists is
ample opportunity for special interest influence in this
area.

Ironically, the cooperation bet ween NASA and its

contractors does not appear to have enhanced technology
transfer, on the contrary, the system which has evolved

for handling space research spinoff seems to prevent such
transfer from reaching its maximum potential.

The basic

stumbling block to effective technology transfer seems to
be the recognition by NASA of contractor rights to spinoff

inventions, and it can be well argued that such recognition
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is on rather shaky legal ground.

In terms of incremental-

ist reasoning, however, contractor influence is
legitimate.

Thus we must first turn to incrementalism’s theoretical

arguments in this conclusion.
To be incrementalist is to favor small steps rather

than big ones in changing government programs.
is recommended by the

Such caution

incrementalists because they believe

that the choices facing policy makers are much too complex
i

or them to handle.

Yet it could be argued that incremen-

talists view complex situations as being all alike in their

unwieldiness, while in the patent policy area certain factors exist which tend to mitigate its complexity.

The over-

all d i ssat i si ac t i on with NASA patent policy of nearly every-

body affected by it has caused numerous studies of the problem to be made.

These studies in turn allow one to discern

not only the points of disagreement between title and lic-

ense policy advocates, they also indicate weaknesses of NASA

patent policy about which all parties agree.
have long argued that partisan analysis

non-partisan analysis because it
a

is

Incrementalists

more reliable than

is

likely to be focused on

narrow area and deeply gone into.

Yet it is difficult to

see why one should not be able to evaluate differing parti-

san analyses with a view to finding their common elements
and proposing new solutions to their disagreements.

This

is the very process that Charles Lindblom describes as occur-

ring between competing groups when they arrive at new and
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unanticipated solutions to their disputes.

Thus the incre-

mentalists seem to be saying that complex problems
can be
solved by competing groups but not by independent
researchers, which seems to be a rather arbitrary
position.
It can
be said with reasonable assurance that no one
finds the present fuzzy nature of NASA patent policy to be
advantageous;
it results in too much red tape and uncertainty
for develop-

ment of spinoff inventions to look like an attractive
proposition.

What seems to be needed is

a

technology transfer

program that does not get snarled up in legal disputes over
what invention belongs to whom; a proposal for such

a pro-

gram will be described at the end of this chapter.

The

establishment of such a program would, of course, be

a com-

prehensivist approach to the problem of patent policy because
the program would deal with all types of technology, not

just patentable inventions.

Another incrementalist argument stipulates the presence of a balance of power between interest groups which

supposedly reduces the need for government to protect itself

from them.

But natural competition between interest groups

in the patent policy area does not seem present.

Perhaps

it could be argued that such a balance of power is more

likely to occur in conventional political settings such as
the labor policy field where the conflict situations are
not too varying, and the participants come to know each other

fairly well.

In the realm of patent policy, however,

such

77

set piece battles replete with "rules of the
game" do not

occur.

Instead we seem to have a

NASA— industrial complex

on one side and a few academics and congressmen on
the other
side.

It is hard

to

see which interest grouos would serve

as natural competition to government contractors which
re-

ceive favorable treatment in regard to patent rights.

The

most likely candidates would be those businesses which do
not do government contract work, but which nevertheless

could make use of various spinoff inventions.
these

Unfortunately,

'have not" companies do not have very much in common

except the negative factor of being left out.

The course

and fruits of scientific research appear to be too unore-

dictable for the formation of interest groups other than
the participants in government science themselves.

In the

patent policy area, incrementalists seem to find a surfeit
of complexity in one field, that of problem analysis, while

on the other hand they seem to oversimplify, or make unwar-

ranted assumptions about group processes in the formation
of patent policy.
It is quite true that pressure groups have influenced

patent policy, yet it is hard to find comfort in incremen-

talism's claim that this is a healthy phenomenon.

It can

be argued that interest group influence is, as Lowi claims,
a

corruptor of democratic government rather than an adjunct

to it.

The fact that NASA's waiver and licensing policy

was established in 195# mainly by the NASA Administrator
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and his staff of patent counsels would seem
to indicate that
policy vacuums are not necessarily filled in a
democratic

manner.

NASA’s initial patent policy was apparently
pattern-

ed with very little reflection or questioning
after that of
the DOD

in a

d_e

•

Also, NASA’s patent policy hearings in 1962 were,

facto sense, limited to industry representatives,

which was hardly democratic.

As both these examples indicate,

the incrementalist idea that the public’s wishes are
somehow

communicated up through interest grouDs to policy makers is

plainly not the case in the patent policy field

When the

•

Congress delegates its responsibilities to administrative
agencies, a power vacuum exists, and this vacuum seems to
be filled by those entities potent enough to make their wishes felt, be they agencies,

clientele, or both.

It should be

noted that the public policies that result from this process
are not necessarily consistent, effective,

or democratic,

which should not be surprising since their formation
in a sense,

is,

rather haphazard.

The blurring of the boundary line between the public

and private sectors, which does not disturb incrementalists,

seems partly responsible for the apparent ineffectiveness
of patent policy as a technology transfer device.

One attri-

bute of interest group influence is a non-resolution of basic
issues; this is part of its haphazardness.

Space research

and development is not, and will probably never be a perfectly

public or private interprise, yet some instrumentality needs
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to take responsibility for space
research spinoff in order
for it to reach its maximum potential.
Disputes over own-

ership of technological spinoff interfere
with technology
transfer because the boundary line between
what belongs to
the public and what belongs to private
parties
is not in

practice very clear.

Under these circumstances contractors

are uncertain about how much investment
they should make in
a spinoff invention,

but at the same time they are reluctant

to relinquish all claims to it.

The relationship between NASA and industry is one
of

cooperation but it seems to be cooperation of

a

sort in which

the roles and contributions of each side are poorly
defined.

Thus the present patent policy muddle came about in part

because both public and private sectors were trying to do
two opposite things at the same time: contractor influence

and NASA's receptivity to it is one form of public/private

cooperation," but each side also felt compelled in setting
NASA patent policy to exercise self-assertion and self-interest.

Therefore NASA tries to spread soinoff technology to

non-contractors in order to polish the image of space research
as a contributor to the national economy, while the contrac-

tors continue to assert their right to spinoff inventions

arising from contract work.

What seems to be needed is

a

definitive expression of public policy regarding space research patents which would be made at

a

that of the participants themselves.

Cooperation between

higher level than

so

the public and private sectors is a
prerequisite for effec-

tive technology transfer, and the Research
Association proposal, which will be discussed later, might
remedy many of
the difficulties of the present ownership-oriented
technol-

ogy transfer system.
One final aspect of the theoretical controversy betwee

incrementalists and comprehensivists should be touched upon,
and that is their disagreement over the presence of values
in analysis of political phenomena.

Incrementalists seem

to take on a cloak of neutrality in their political analy-

ses, while comprehensivists see nothing wrong with being

influenced by values.

It must be said that if this paper

were written from an incrementalist point of view it would
seem impossible to treat the basic unfairness of NASA’s

patent policy as a matter of concern.

Thus one of the pri-

mary catalysts of the title advocates would be eliminated.
It can be argued that values have practical utility in the

sense that they are analogous to the self interest motiva-

tion of the pressure group analysts.

Indeed it could be

said that an offended sense of justice is a stimulus to

both guardians of the public interest and guardians of
special interests.

Yet if we were to follow an incremen-

talist course in resolving the patent policy problem, non-

contractors would probably continue to be discriminated

against because questions of fairness to out-group members
do not seem to be very important to incrementalists.

Also,

taxpayers would be committed to the long-term support
of

certain companies which incrementalists would perhaps
fat-

alistically accept.
In the final analysis, comprehensivism seems to
be

the best path to follow in trying to straighten out
the

patent policy muddle, although comprehensivists may have
to settle for a less than complete victory.

As Francis E.

Rourke points out, expertise presents a challenge to the

cherished beliefs of both comprehensivism and incrementalism.

This is because expertise is a source of bureaucratic

power in itself.

Expertise does not fit well into the in-

crementalist group process model, thus the need for some
outside controls over experts is apparent.

On the other

hand, the intrinsic worth of specialized knowledge challen-

ges the comprehensivist

*

s

distrust of localist power.

On

balance our science policy seems to stand in need of more,
and not less goal-setting and coordination.

argued that

a

It could be

small group of people such as contractors and

scientists do not constitute a science policy ''constituency,"
and that such a constituency really ought to be thought of
as the public as a whole.

But at the same time it must be

said that it is hard to make science recognize legal boun-

dary lines.

It should not,

however, be impossible to formu-

late public policies which allow the public and private

sectors to cooperate in enhancing technology transfer through

programs which are fair to non-contractors, and not incidental!
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which recognize the public's ultimate
right to research
spinoff which it has paid for.
Now we shall briefly review the
factual data connected
with the patent policy problem. The
legal framework behind
AoA s patent policy is characterized
by vagueness
and at

the same time great complexity.

Section 305 of the NASA

Act of 1958, which deals with "Property
Rights in Inventions"
fails to define in whom those property
rights should vest.
It is true that NASA is given the
prerogative to lay claim
to virtually any invention arising from
space program re-

search, but in practice it is the NASA
Administrator who

makes the final decision.

Despite the fact that the realm

patents is a highly legalistic one where clear language
and

intention would seem essential, the NASA Administrator
is
admonished by the NASA Act only to act "in the public interest" in deciding on patent rights.

Such evasion of basic

issues and delegation of power are hallmarks of incrementalism but they seem highly inappropriate to patent oolicy.

Where Section 305 was vacant of any guides regarding
the disposition of patent rights, the JFK Memorandum on

patent policy, which NASA adopted, can be said to provide
too many guidelines.

The JFK policy attempts to define cir-

cumstances by which it can be decided on

a

case-by-case basis

whether the public interest is served by the government or
the contractor taking title.

The JFK policy is on no firmer

ground than Section 305 because the basic question of the

#3

taxpayer’s right to spinoff is not grappled
with.

Instead,
the JFK waiver policies are quite openly
adjusted to, among

other things, the contractor’s commercial
interest in an
invention.
Because of this favoritism towards contractors,
NASA's licensing program, which is aimed at
bringing SDinoff
inventions to non-contractors, must often deal only
with leftover inventions. Essentially, the JFK policy allows
various

government agencies to continue the patent policies to
which
they are already accustomed.

While this is an incremental

and politically safe approach, it does not bring us any
closer
to effective technology transfer.

Section 305 and the JFK policy supply the legal framework for current patent policy) the George Washington University report indicates the results of that policy.
nately,

the results are rather discouraging.

Unfortu-

The GWU report

cites a rather dismal record of invention disclosure and
usage.

The conclusions that the GWU authors draw from their

statistics are open to debate, however.

They take a pro-

contractor stand right from the start of their report, which
could lead one to question their objectivity.

The justifi-

cation for the license policy stand which the GWU authors
cite is this:

NASA patents have shown themselves to be of

such little value that the incentive of an exclusive patent
right is needed before a business will take on development
of a spinoff invention.

It is interesting to note the GWU

authors' narrowness of focus

-

they only rarely touch upon

*4

substantive questions such as the government's
equity in
spinoff technology or the discrimination
against non-contractors.
The arbitrariness of the GWU authors is
evident
in their rejection of the idea that the
taxpayer "pays twice"
for a spinoff invention when purchased from
a business holding monopoly rights to it.

The taxpayers do not pay twice

because, say the GWU authors, spinoff is only

a

by-product

of research and the government's property rights
extend

only to products anticipated in the contract.

How far the

government's property rights extend in research it

is fund-

ing is, of course, the crux of the whole patent policy con-

troversy.

Yet the GWU authors state their opinion seemingly

as if it were an established fact.

One does not necessarily have to draw the conclusion

from the apparent paucity of space research spinoff that
license policy is called for.

a

The GWU authors rely heavily

on information supplied by aero-space contractors, who, the

authors admit, may not always make the fullest accounting
of spinoff.

The lack of technological fruitfulness of space

research on which the GWU authors base their license policy

advocacy is really a matter for debate.

To focus merely on

that technology which happens to be patentable probably eives
a

misleading picture of the value of technological spinoff.
A

a

well functioning technology disclosure program, plus

potent technology promotion program are prerequisites for

effective technology transfer.

Yet as the GWU report indicates,

*5

present efforts in these areas are having
difficulties.
The disclosure program in particular seems
to be foundering, with fewer new technology disclosures
coming out of

space research than the average for all types of
government

science research.
ties offered by the

The solution for the disclosure difficulGW1J

authors would only reinforce the

already advantageous position of the contractors in government science: the GWU authors suggest that the contractors

need an "incentive" such as patent rights for them to faith-

fully report to NASA all new technology arising from contracted research.

This pro-contractor argument is revealing in

that it implies that the contractors are in a position to

willfully hold back disclosures of new technology if they

Even if a failure to disclose new technology results

wish.

purely from oversight, the fact still remains that the present disclosure system is highly dependent on the vigilance
and honesty of the contractors.

It could be argued that

such a critical link in technology transfer should not be
left to parties who naturally would prefer to hang onto as

much spinoff as they could.
A

basic assumption of the GWU report seems to be that

contractors are the best candidates for developing spinoff
technology, but information in the Harbridge House report
tends to refute this.

The Harbridge House report noted that

government contractors acquire patents to government sponsored inventions for such diverse reasons as: to get
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recognition of

a

company’s technical competence, to use pat-

ents as barter in acquiring licenses from other
companies,
and to retain patent rights in order to insure design
flexi-

bility.

Out of six categories of government contractors

granted patent rights, the Harbridge House report said that
two categories were made up of contractors (some of them
among
the government’s largest) who were simply not patent sensitive,
une category was only mildly interested in marketing govern-

ment-sponsored inventions.

Another contained companies whose

interest was fragmented unevenly among various internal divisions (of the company)

•

And the final two categories were

very patent sensitive, tending to take on government contracts
in order to acquire spinoff inventions, but only one of these

categories constituted a likely marketing source, the other
does mostly basic research. 2

Thus a contractor oriented

technology transfer system is not necessarily very efficient.
It is clear that if improvements are to be made in this sit-

uation, some basic changes need to be made to remove contractor predominance.

NASA's Office of Technology Utilization (OTU) promotes
space research spinoff.

Government Patent Policy Study,
Part III, p. Ik-IT.

-^-Harbridge House,

Vol

.

The main drawback of OTU’s technology

I,
2

Ibid

.

,

pp.

14-20.
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promotion system seems to be that it cannot
fully vault the
gulf between those who carry on research
and those who oossibly could utilize spinoff from that
research.

To state

the problem another way, the OTU’s activities
do not close

the gap between the public and private sectors,
which seems
to be a prerequisite for effective technology
transfer.

This

is an ironic state of affairs considering the
close ties be-

tween NASA and its contractors, but of course, these contractors constitute only one part of the private sector.

The

OTU programs are a recognition of the fact that the conven-

tional one-to-one relationship between the government and
its contractors must be altered to permit the involvement
of third parties

(such as non-contractor businesses)

technology transfer is to be effective.

if

But at present such

involvement is rather secondhand, with NASA evaluating contractor technology disclosures and relaying the information
on to interested businesses.

A

working familiarity with

certain line of technology seems to be

a

a

necessity for rec-

ognizing fully its possible applications, yet such familiarity is at present pretty much reserved to contractors.

NASA contractors can capitalize quickly on

a

license to one

of their government-sponsored inventions, because it comes
to

them automatically; non-contractors have no such built-

in competitive advantage.

What seems to be needed is a

technology promotion system which would allow interested
parties to examine the work of the contractors while the
work is proceeding, rather than after its completion.

This

would, of course, upset to a degree the contractor’s natural

advantages in controlling spinoff, but it is hopefully evident at this point that such advantages are unfair and not
in the best interests of technology transfer.

The Denver Research Institute report presents perhaos
the firmest evidence that a new system for dealing with tech-

nological spinoff is needed.

One of its clearest messages

is that patentable inventions play only a small part

overall technology transfer process.

in the

The kinds of contri-

butions to science which the report says are made by space
research are of

a

type that are hard to quantify or isolate

into legally claimable pieces, yet they are economically
and scientifically significant.

The present NASA patent

policies seem based on the premise that space technology

spinoff can be somehow packaged and channeled either through
its patent branch or through the OTU, which spends a large

amount of its time promoting non-exclusive licenses to NASAheld patents.

It is this heavy reliance on the natent sys-

tem as a technology transfer device which may be preventing

space research from contributing fully to the nation's eco-

nomic and scientific wealth.

In any case, until an effic-

ient technology transfer system is a reality, it will be

extremely difficult for science policy makers to decide

whether space research is or is not

a

fruitful investment.

The basic idea of a Research Association is that

government and private industry cooperate in carrying on
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scientific research with each side making
to the operation of the Association.

a

contribution

The kind of govern-

ment-industry cooperation in space research which
we now
have is unplanned, lacks conscious design,
and
tends to

force the government to carry most of the financial
risk.
In short,

it is an offspring of what Theodore Lowi
calls

"interest group liberalism."

A

program aimed at bringing

the benefits of space research to the widest possible
range
of potential utilizers would require that the contractor’s

natural familiarity with technological spinoff be shared

with non- contract ors

.

Accordingly,

a

Research Association

aimed at developing uses for spinoff technology would be

made up of parties who would have the right to look in on

relevant contractor projects while still in progress.

Need-

less to say, space technology developed at government expense would not be considered the exclusive property of

any private party; this is essential if Association members
are to use spinoff.

The Research association could not

only bring information concerning space technology to

potential users, but also carry on post-contract research
and development.

Such a program need not be limited to

space research; it could be applicable to government science as a whole, and thus serve to break down power rela-

tionships between certain agencies and their "clientele."
A

spinoff oriented Research Association would serve to

bring government-industry cooperation out into the open
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and

subject it to forms and standards.

It is clear that

our present system of government science stands in need
of basic and comprehensive changes if it is to achieve

maximum effectiveness, and if it is not to degenerate into
a

system of special privilege and private power.
Theodore Lowi in his book The End of Liberalism ar-

gues that a primary characteristic of what he calls interest group liberalism is the devaluation of law.

Such a

devaluation certainly seems to have occurred in the realm
of NASA’s patent policy, with its vagueness, inconsistency,

and its violation of the clearly precedented legal prin-

ciple that the funders of research have property rights
in inventions arising therefrom.

Lowi is strongly attrac-

ted to a return to law and democratic forms as a solution
to

the interest group fragmentation of public policy.

The

Research Association described above would, of course, subject agencies and businesses to laws that are more substantive and comprehensive than are the ones applied now, but

they would probably be only part of the solution.

In the

area of technology transfer, efforts to apDly legal stan-

dards too extensively may result in laws that are ineffective because of the unpredictable and elusive nature of

research.

In this area comprehensivist controls may not

be fully applicable.

Grant McConnell in Private Power and American Demo cracy tends to put more emphasis than Theodore Lowi on
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the power of interest groups.

The mere presence of regu-

lations does not necessarily change the outcome of
interest group desires concerning patent rights, as the
JFK

Patent Policy Memorandum shows.

The real culprit in the

patent policy field is invisibility.

McConnell argues that

the natural tendency of interest groups is to limit consti-

tuency; the concentration of spinoff in the hands of con-

tractors is an example of this

-

it is a limitation of

government science’s "constituency.”

Lowi quite openly

acknowledges that his arguments against interest group

liberalism are on a theoretical plane: he seeks to undermine its support among thinking people "in the hopes that
a change of

theory can have some small impact on history.

"3

But the problem of interest group influence is more than
a

clash of theory.

It will probably be in the political

arena that interest group power will be tamed, although
this is not to say that the Supreme Court, as Lowi
cribes, cannot make a major contribution.

Des-

The Court could

uphold challenges made by non-contractors against contractor-held space program patents, for example.

A

program

designed to maximize the potential of spinoff from government funded research cannot be established by the Court,
however.

This is the responsibility of the Congress and

^Lowi, End of Liberalism

,

p.

29L.
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the Executive branch.

If these bodies can somehow be made

to recognize the inconsistent and opportunistic nature of

interest group generated policy in many areas, then constituency will automatically broaden, and sound public oolicy
should be easier to bring about.
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